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A Largely Private Matter? 
Robert D. Brown, Jack M. Mintz, 
and Thomas A. Wilson 
Corporations may be  “public” (widely held) or “private” (closely held). 
As has long been recognized in the industrial organization literature, be- 
ginning with Berle and Means (1932), the performance of widely held cor- 
porations may differ from that of those that are closely held for a variety of 
reasons (see, e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976; and Demsetz 1983). Private 
corporations may be governed better than public firms since managers in 
public firms have greater incentives to “shirk” by enjoying nonpecuniary 
benefits (Williamson  1978), or controlling shareholders of public firms 
may make decisions that have negative consequences for new shareholders 
after an initial public offering (Bebchuk and Zingales, chap. 2 in this vol- 
ume). On the other hand, owners of private businesses may be less willing 
to take on risk (owing to a lack of opportunities to diversify risk) or might 
face constraints in raising equity finance. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine how taxation can influence 
businesses’ choice between private and public status. In section 4.1, we 
begin with a review of the primary differences between U.S. and Canadian 
tax systems that might influence the extent to which corporations might 
be privately held. Our review suggests that the Canadian tax system may 
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provide some inducement for corporations to be kept private. This arises 
from special favorable treatment given to certain private corporations, in 
particular, lower corporate income taxes  on active business income re- 
tained in the corporation and a special capital gains tax exemption. U.S. 
tax law also encourages individuals to sell shares more readily than Canad- 
ian tax law does, and the Canadian  exemption  for intercorporate divi- 
dends, along with a less restrictive approach to the use of nonvoting shares, 
may create more complex corporate structures, allowing private compa- 
nies to control public ones. 
Then, in section 4.2, we examine a simple model to simulate the decision 
of entrepreneurs to go public. On the one hand, private ownership avoids 
any agency costs that arise by  going public but may result in businesses 
failing to undertake sufficient investment owing to insufficient internal re- 
sources. On the other hand, a public offering of the firm can create oppor- 
tunities  to obtain capital at a cheaper price, although there may be an 
agency cost that is incurred since outside investors do not have full infor- 
mation to control the effort and risk-taking decisions of entrepreneurs. 
With this model, we can show that lower taxes on the return to investment 
in private firms, compared to the return on investment for public firms, 
encourage greater numbers  of privately  held  companies. On the  other 
hand, income and wealth taxes on entrepreneurs that reduce their ability 
to fund investments internally may encourage greater public offerings of 
businesses. 
In section 4.3, we  provide a simulation of the theoretical model de- 
scribed in section 4.2. We then review the data and find that there tends 
to be a much greater share of Canadian corporate wealth held in private 
companies in Canada than in the United States. This would be consistent 
with our simulation. 
4.1  Canadian and U.S. Treatment of Private and Public Companies 
In this section, we review a number of special features of the Canadian 
tax system, consider how these may influence the behavior of Canadian 
entrepreneurs and corporate shareholders, and contrast this with the cor- 
responding tax treatment in the United States, with 1997 as the reference 
year. We then discuss whether-and  how-particular  Canadian tax issues 
may influence growing Canadian companies to remain private perhaps to 
a greater extent than they do in the United States. Comparisons of the 
size of the private corporate sectors in Canada and the United States are 
provided in the following section. 
4.1.1 
The tax issues relating to corporate operations and ownership must be 
understood in the context of the overall tax system, including that affect- 
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ing individuals. The average top rate of personal income tax-combined 
federal and provincial-in  Canada is about 51 percent, in comparison to 
an average federal and state level of 43-44  percent in the United States. 
But the significant difference in Canada is that the Canadian rate structure 
is much more progressive at moderate income levels: these top rates are 
reached in Canada at a level of income of approximately U.S.$43,000, in 
contrast to an income level  of over U.S.$250,000 for the top rate in  the 
United States. 
As a generalization, it would be somewhat more difficult in Canada than 
in the United States for investors to accumulate capital in the absence of 
certain provisions, reviewed below. 
4.1.2 
In considering the tax position of smaller business enterprises, the fol- 
lowing general features of the Canadian tax system are relevant (within 
each case, the corresponding position in the United States is noted).’ 
Dividend Tax Credit 
Individual  shareholders receiving dividends from  Canadian corpora- 
tions are entitled to the equivalent of a 25 percent dividend tax credit. The 
mechanics of this, which involve an integrated approach under federal and 
provincial tax regimes, require the amount of the dividends being “grossed 
up” by  25 percent for inclusion in  the individual’s taxable income, but 
with the individual receiving a dividend tax credit roughly equivalent to 
20  percent  of the amount  of the grossed-up dividends. This effectively 
reduces the tax rate payable by individuals on Canadian dividend income, 
with the top personal tax rate falling to about 35 percent (combined fed- 
eral and provincial tax) on such income, instead of the normal combined 
51 percent. The gross up and the dividend tax credit are applied to essen- 
tially all dividends from taxable Canadian corporations and are not re- 
lated to the actual corporate taxes paid by the corporation. 
As noted below, the dividend tax credit has the effect of largely eliminat- 
ing the double taxation of certain corporate source income received by 
Canadian-controlled private corporations and flowed out to their Cana- 
dian individual shareholders as dividends but serves as only a partial offset 
to the corporate tax paid when such dividends are paid out of fully taxed 
income by other Canadian companies (such as public companies). In the 
United States, in contrast, dividends are not subject to special treatment 
when received by individual taxpayers and bear full personal tax with no 
relief for the corporate tax on the income out of which they are distributed. 
General Features of the Taxation of Business Income 
1. In this section, all dollar amounts given with respect to the Canadian tax system are in 
Canadian dollars except where otherwise noted, while amounts relating to the U.S.  tax sys- 
tem are in U.S. dollars. At the time of writing, the exchange value of the Canadian dollar 
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As  discussed later, U.S. entrepreneurs do have the availability of  sub- 
chapter S elections and limited-liability corporations (LLCs) to avoid the 
double tax on dividend income. 
Intercorporate Dividends 
In Canada, dividends received by one Canadian company from another 
taxable Canadian company are generally free of corporate tax. (Private 
corporations receiving portfolio dividends from other Canadian compa- 
nies are liable to pay a special “antideferral” tax on these dividends: the 
tax is fully refundable to the company when this income is distributed to 
its shareholders as dividends.) 
In the United States, the position is more complex, and significant taxes 
can be imposed on dividends received by  one U.S. corporation from an- 
other. In brief terms, dividends can flow tax free between U.S. companies 
only if the one company has a substantial (frequently 80 percent) interest 
in the other: Dividends received by one U.S. corporation from another are 
included in taxable income to the extent of  30 percent if  less than a 20 
percent interest (votes or values) is held, are included in taxable income 
to the extent of 20 percent if the holdings is 20-80  percent, and are totally 
exempt if  more than an 80 percent interest is held. Dividends flow  tax 
free between companies that jointly file a consolidated return (generally 
requiring an 80 percent or greater interest [votes and value] being held by 
a U.S. parent in the group). 
Capital Gains 
Taxable capital gains are included in income in Canada to the extent of 
three-quarters of  such gains, and capital losses in general can be offset 
only against taxable gains, not against ordinary income, with carryovers 
provided. At the corporate level, the effective combined federal and pro- 
vincial tax on capital gains at the general rate of corporate income tax is 
roughly 32 percent, while, for individuals in the top rate bracket, the total 
personal tax on such gains would amount to about 38 percent. (Canadian- 
controlled private corporations [CCPCs] recognizing capital gains do pay 
a further “antideferral” tax on this income, fully refundable when the gain 
is distributed.) 
In the United States, capital gains are fully taxable, but, for individuals, 
special tax rates apply to the amount of such gains. For corporations, 
capital gains are taxed as ordinary income, with the effective (federal and 
state) corporate rate being about 38 percent. For individuals in the United 
States prior to the 1997 tax changes, the effective federal top tax rate on 
capital gains would have amounted to about 28 percent. Under new rules 
adopted in  1997, the effective federal tax  on longer-term  capital gains 
(with respect to assets held at least eighteen months) is now 20 percent 
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percent) being applied to medium-term capital gains (with a one-year to 
eighteen-month holding period). 
The legislation also provides that, after the year 2000, very long-term 
gains (on assets held over five years) will be taxed at a federal rate of only 
18 percent  (8 percent for certain lower-income individuals). Of course, 
most, but not all, states have personal income taxes that will raise the total 
effective tax on capital gains by an average of about 5 percentage points. 
The new  U.S. rules mean that effective capital gains tax rates in Canada 
for individuals will be substantially above those in the United States. Both 
countries have incentive capital gains provisions for entrepreneurs: a spe- 
cial lifetime exemption of up to $500,000 in Canada, half rates on gains 
on certain “original issue” stock in the United States. Both measures are 
discussed below. 
Death Tuxes 
Canada does not have any estate tax, succession duty, or gift taxes either 
at the federal  or the provincial  level. Instead,  most  capital  assets are 
deemed to be realized at their fair market value at death (or on some inter 
vivos transfers), with the resulting gain or loss included in the deceased’s 
final tax return. (There are “rollovers” of assets at the deceased’s adjusted 
cost base available with respect to transfers to spouses and certain spou- 
sal trusts.) 
In the United States, summarizing a complex tax picture, the estates of 
deceased individuals are subject to federal estate tax and, additionally, in 
many cases to state taxes (with a limited credit with respect to such state 
taxes available on the federal return). There is also a federal gift tax, inte- 
grated  with  the estate  tax.  Deferral  of  tax  is available on transfers to 
spouses. However, for income tax purposes, assets transferred on the own- 
er’s death to a beneficiary generally have a basis equal to their fair value 
at that time, thus totally avoiding income tax on any accrued gain. U.S. fed- 
eral rates of estate tax range from 18 up to 55 percent, subject to a general 
exemption of $625,000 (rising to $1 million over the next nine years). 
As a judgmental  generalization,  the Canadian deemed realization  at 
death is substantially less on medium-size and larger estates than the U.S. 
estate tax. However, in both countries, estate-planning techniques can re- 
duce effective burdens, particularly on larger estates. 
4.1.3 
In accordance with the practice in many countries, small business cor- 
porations in Canada receive a variety of special tax incentives and conces- 
sions. However, the difference is that, in Canada, such tax incentives are 
generally larger than elsewhere-Canada  has one of the most favorable tax 
regimes, relative to the general tax system, for small business enterprises of 
any country in the world. Further,  the Canadian incentives are distin- 
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guished by the fact that most of them are reserved exclusively for CCPCs, 
which can be of any size, as opposed to small corporations generally. 
In this discussion, Canadian-controlled means that an enterprise is not 
controlled, directly or indirectly, by nonresidents of Canada. And the term 
private company simply refers to a company that does not have equity or 
debt securities traded on public markets (or that is controlled by a public 
company). 
4.1.4  Tax Incentives for Private Business 
The main specific provisions providing special treatment of private or 
smaller (the terms are far from synonymous) companies are noted below. 
Lower Corporate Rates 
CCPCs pay a combined federal and provincial tax rate of about 2 1 per- 
cent on the first $200,000 of active business income, in contrast  to the 
general combined federal and provincial corporate tax rate of 43 percent. 
The reduction is achieved through the “small business deduction,” which 
reduces the federal corporate income tax rate for CCPCs by 16 percentage 
points to 13.12 percent (with surtax) on this first slice of active business 
income, with most provinces also having lower rates for the same income, 
again confined to CCPCs. Total federal and provincial rates in 1997 vary 
from  18.12 percent in Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, and the Northwest 
Territories to 22.62 percent in Ontario. (Lower provincial rates are avail- 
able in some provinces for manufacturing activities.) The $200,000 limit, 
along with some other incentives, must be  shared among an associated 
group of companies. 
Tux Integration 
An important effect of the lower rate for small business in Canada is 
that shareholders of CCPCs benefit from having their corporate and indi- 
vidual income taxes more fully integrated than are the corporate and in- 
dividual income taxes of  shareholders of larger businesses. For CCPCs, 
the lower rate of federal and provincial income tax of about 21 percent on 
the first $200,000 of active business income (in contrast with the general 
combined corporate rate of about 43 percent) means that the corporate 
and personal taxes on such profits are roughly integrated when the after- 
tax corporate income is paid out to individuals and covered by the divi- 
dend tax credit. The result is an individual shareholder paying about the 
same total tax (corporate and personal) on distributed profits out of such 
income as if he or she had earned the income personally. There is also a 
complex regime for the taxation of income from property-investment 
income-that  provides the same benefits of full integration  for such in- 
come earned in a CCPC, regardless of amount. 
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ness income of up to $200,000 is clawed back as the CCPC grows in size. 
The federal incentive starts to be recovered when the CCPC reaches $10 
million of capital and is fully phased out when capital reaches $15 million: 
provincial incentives are also generally clawed  back  as the CCPC’s in- 
come rises. 
In the United States, the federal tax code provides for reduced corpo- 
rate  rates of tax for lower-income corporations:  15 percent for taxable 
income  up  to $50,000; 25 percent for taxable income from  $50,000 to 
$75,000; 34 percent for taxable income from $75,000 to $10,000,000; and 
35 percent for taxable income over $10,000,000. The benefits of the lower 
rates on the first $75,000 of  income are clawed back as income exceeds 
$100,000, and the  1 percent tax reduction  (a 34 percent corporate rate 
instead of the general 35 percent rate) is also recovered as income exceeds 
$1 5 million. 
However, regardless of the level of income, U.S. corporations and their 
shareholders face a significant burden through the double taxation of cor- 
porate income since IZO  relief is provided to individuals receiving dividends 
from such companies with respect to the corporate tax already paid. Ac- 
cordingly, not only is the Canadian treatment of the business income of 
smaller corporations  relatively more generous than that in  the  United 
States, but the full integration of corporate and personal taxes means that 
the distributed income of smaller Canadian corporations is not subject to 
a substantial tax penalty, as is the case in the United States. However, U.S. 
entrepreneurs have available special operating forms-the  subchapter S 
election and the LLC (both discussed below)-to  attain the equivalent 
benefits of full integration. 
The ability of shareholder-managers of CCPCs to achieve a fully inte- 
grated  tax is  expanded through  the administrative  practice  of  allowing 
such companies to pay  bonuses, almost without  limit, to shareholder- 
managers  so  as  to maintain  active  business  income  at  or  below  the 
$200,000 annual threshold. The funds so bonused to shareholder-man- 
agers are subject to personal tax only and can be loaned back to the com- 
pany if required in the business. The validity of bonuses paid to share- 
holder-managers  is  subject to a greater degree of review in the United 
States than in Canada, and, in general, such bonuses must be justified as 
being reasonable compensation for services provided. 
The U.S. tax system does have features that allow for the equivalent 
of a full integration of corporate and personal taxes for private business 
operations. The first of these is the subchapter S elections. U.S. corpora- 
tions with relatively simple share structures (one class of shares), having 
only U.S. individuals or other qualifying entities as shareholders (and hav- 
ing no more than seventy-five shareholders), and meeting other criteria 
are allowed to elect to have their income taxed only in the hands of their 
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to corporate income tax but is required  to be allocated currently to its 
individual shareholders. This treatment eliminates the double taxation of 
corporate income while still enabling the business to benefit from limited 
liability and other features of the corporate form of organization. 
In addition, there has been a growing use of LLC entities-essentially 
organizations that have limited liability but lack some of the other char- 
acteristics of  ordinary corporations-which  are also treated  as conduit 
vehicles for tax purposes: their income is not subject to corporate tax but 
is allocated to and taxed  currently in the hands of its member-owners. 
The LLC has some advantage in flexibility over a subchapter S election, 
but both are widely used by U.S. entrepreneurs to carry on small and even 
large U.S. businesses. Compared  to the Canadian CCPC, the LLC and 
subchapter  S election  have  the advantage  that there  is  no limit  to the 
amount of  business  income that  can be earned and flowed through to 
shareholders without any “double tax” penalty. 
The Canadian CCPC does, however, have the advantage of a significant 
tax deferral for earnings retained in the business-qualifying  business in- 
come up to $200,000 is taxed currently at a low rate, with further personal 
tax postponed until actual distribution. 
Cupital Gains 
Canada has a unique feature allowing a $500,000 lifetime capital gains 
exemption to individuals on gains realized on shares of qualifying CCPCs 
(and on farm property). For this  purpose,  any CCPC with most of its 
assets used in an active business in Canada, without size limitation, quali- 
fies its shareholders for this special exemption. 
The United States also has a special tax regime applying to gains on the 
sale of certain small business companies. Only 50 percent of qualifying 
gains are included in income (and eligible for capital gain treatment), al- 
though 100 percent of losses are still recognized. This special treatment is 
available only to individuals (and certain other noncorporate entities) and 
applies only to gains realized on shares acquired on original issue from a 
corporation after 10 August 1993 and held for at least five years. Further, 
only shares in a corporation  having  assets of less than $50 million  and 
meeting tests to demonstrate that it is almost exclusively engaged in an 
active trade or business (other than certain excluded  activities, such as 
personal services, hospitality,  banking,  resource extraction,  etc.) qualify 
as original issue shares.2 The gain eligible for this exclusion is limited to 
the lesser of $10 million or ten times the investor’s cost basis in the stock. 
The U.S.  incentive is more favorable for larger gains than the Canadian 
exemption, but its application is much more restricted. 
2. Guenther and Willenborg (1998) conclude that this favorable tax treatment has both 
increased the price at which shares of qualifying small businesses are sold in an initial public 
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Investors in CCPCs are allowed a more generous treatment with respect 
to capital losses on shares or debt on CCPCs primarily carrying on an 
active business in Canada: in general, they can claim 75 percent of such 
losses (allowable business investment loss), not only against capital gains, 
but also against ordinary income (with no maximum). The U.S. tax rules 
contain a much more limited provision allowing investors to write off up 
to  a  $100,000 loss  on  their  investment  in  a  small  business enterprise 
against ordinary income. 
Capital Tax 
A capital tax is imposed under the “large corporations tax” on companies 
in Canada, but there is an exemption for the first $10 million of taxable 
capital that effectively eliminates federal capital taxes for small business. 
Some provinces also impose general corporate capital taxes, but many ex- 
empt or provide lower rates of tax on capital below a certain threshold. 
In the United States, there is no federal tax on corporate capital, while 
some states levy capital taxes at varying rates. 
Other Features 
The Canadian tax rules contain a variety of other special provisions 
targeted at smaller private companies: an enhanced scientific research and 
experimental development tax credit, available only to CCPCs within cer- 
tain size limitations; a deferral of tax on stock options issued by  small 
businesses to employees, with the result that no tax arises when the option 
is exercised, only when a gain on the stock acquired is realized; enhanced 
treatment for investors in labor-sponsored  venture capital corporations 
with respect to investments in smaller businesses; measures that reduce the 
tax compliance burden on small corporations; provisions allowing smaller 
corporations to obtain “after-tax” financing on more favorable terms than 
other c~mpanies;~  the right to use funds in registered retirement savings 
plans (RRSPs) to invest, within limits, in a CCPC. 
In general, U.S. federal tax law contains relatively few other provisions 
benefiting smaller corporations as such, although some states provide lim- 
ited concessions. 
4.1.5 
In Canada, there are a large number of tax incentives and special treat- 
ments available to private companies in general and to CCPCs in particu- 
lar, including a substantially  reduced corporate rate of tax  on the first 
$200,000 of annual active business income, the full integration (absence of 
double taxation) on such business income plus all income from property, 
Both Countries Favor Smaller Companies 
3. This can be done by issuing preferred shares to banks and others on which the dividends 
to the recipient company are not taxable-up  to a limit of  $500,000 a year. For smaller 
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and a $500,000 lifetime capital gains exemption to the owners of the shares 
of such companies. 
The Canadian tax system does offer a limited dividend tax credit that 
offsets part of the burden of the double tax on corporate source income 
that would otherwise apply: the United  States has no similar provision. 
On the other hand, owners of private U.S. enterprises have mechanisms 
available under U.S. tax law (subchapter S elections and LLCs) that also 
offer the advantages of integration and avoid the double taxation of corpo- 
rate income, without limit, through allowing such income to be taxed only 
at the personal level. 
The Canadian tax system does, however, have the substantial advantage 
of a deferral of personal tax on retained business earnings built up from 
the $200,000 a year amount of active business income eligible for the lower 
corporate rate-a  benefit that is not available to LLCs or subchapter S 
companies in the United States. In the Canadian tax system, this deferral 
of personal tax can amount to 30 percent of pretax business income (the 
difference between the 51 percent top personal rate and the 21 percent 
corporate rate), or $60,000 a year (30 percent of  $200,000). Over a ten- 
year period, this could result in a tax deferral of over $0.5 million-far 
larger than the corresponding amount in the United States. 
There are, of course, important potential gains to be achieved through 
going public-including  the possibility of obtaining additional funding at 
better rates, achieving a premium value relating to the easier transferabil- 
ity of ownership, and so on. With respect to tax issues, Canadian entrepre- 
neurs have the advantage of a $500,000 lifetime capital gains exemption 
on their shares, while, in the United States, individuals may qualify for a 
50 percent tax discount on the realization of long-term gains on original 
issue shares held in qualifying small businesses. The tax advantages of 
going public tend to be roughly similar in both countries, except possibly 
that the United States, with a better-developed capital market for smaller 
public enterprises, offers better returns to such enterprises that go public. 
On balance, a critical difference may be the ability of CCPCs to build 
up significant retained earnings out of business income that has borne 
only a relatively low rate of corporate tax. This feature may therefore pro- 
vide a modest inducement for Canadian CCPCs to remain private for a 
longer period than might similar U.S. companies operating under U.S. law. 
4.1.6  Tax Treatment of Dividends and Capital Gains 
In Canada, individuals pay about the same rate of personal tax in upper 
income brackets on dividends as on capital gains. In the United States, 
dividends are fully taxed as ordinary income, but capital gains are eligible 
for much more favored treatment, with a combined federal and state tax 
burden that may be below 25 percent (and possibly eligible for even more 
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The substantial tax advantage of receiving capital gains rather than divi- 
dends would tend to induce U.S. shareholders of U.S. private companies 
to prefer “cashing in” their gains through sale, rather than receiving dis- 
tributed earnings. In Canada, the relative neutrality between the taxation 
of dividends and that of capital gains will tend to mean that there is less 
tax reason for entrepreneurs to realize accumulated earnings through sale 
(other than those gains qualifying for the $500,000 lifetime capital gains 
exemption). 
4.1.7  Death Taxes Influence Holdings 
Canada has a deemed realization of capital assets at death, while the 
United States has an estate tax that is generally more onerous. The fact 
that the Canadian tax system has a lower net burden at death on larger 
estates may mean slightly less pressure on older taxpayers to arrange for 
companies to go public and thus facilitate liquidity for investments in such 
enterprises. In the United States, the threat of death duties may influence 
owners of smaller enterprises to have their corporations go public to a 
greater degree than prevails under the Canadian system. 
4.1.8  Complex Corporate Structures Facilitated in Canada 
The absence of tax on dividends paid  between Canadian companies 
could be a reason making for more complex corporate group structures in 
Canada,  as there  is  no general tax penalty-as  there  would be in the 
United  States-for  holding  blocks  of  dividend-paying  shares  (but  less 
than complete ownership) in other companies. When combined with the 
greater acceptability in Canada of the use of nonvoting equity shares in 
the capital structures of public companies, complex corporate structures 
involving layers of corporations that  permit  family groups to maintain 
control with less than 51 percent of the economic interest in other enter- 
prises can provide advantages to a few private corporations. 
4.1.9  Summary 
Overall, the general Canadian tax rules appear to provide, directly and 
indirectly, some moderate but appreciable inducements for Canadian en- 
trepreneurs to have their corporations remain as private companies to a 
greater extent than would prevail in the United States. However, it is im- 
portant not to overstate these inducements, which may in many particular 
cases be more than offset by nontax factors and other specific tax factors. 
Prospective reforms to the Canadian federal tax structure could reduce 
this in~entive.~  On the other hand, the province of Ontario plans to cut its 
4.  The Technical Committee  on  Business Taxation  (1998) has recommended  that  the 
$500,000 capital gains tax be eliminated, coupled with a provision to allow capital gains for 
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small business corporate rate  in  half  over the next  seven years, which 
would increase the incentive.' 
4.2  A Simple Entrepreneurial Model: 
The Choice between Private and Public 
In this section, as a basis for the simulation offered in the next section, 
we  consider  a  simple  two-period  model  of  an  entrepreneur  deciding 
whether to maintain a company under private (closely held) ownership or 
move to public (widely held) ownership.'j If the company is  private, the 
entrepreneur is the only owner and may not have sufficient resources to 
fund a desired level of capital. Should the company go public, the entre- 
preneur will have better access to financing investment but may incur an 
agency cost that adversely affects the profitability of the company. The 
agency cost is related to the inability  of investors fully to monitor the 
entrepreneur's effort to achieve an efficient level of production and an ap- 
propriate level of risk for the firm.' 
As discussed in the previous section, taxes affect the entrepreneur's deci- 
sion to create a public company in several ways. First, the tax rates on 
dividend  and capital gains income derived from the private and public 
firms account for the degree of integration between corporate and per- 
sonal income taxes for each type of firm. Capital gains taxes at death and 
taxes on wealth transferred to heirs may also be important. Although es- 
tate taxes (and taxes on deemed realizations of capital gains) apply to 
wealth  transfers,  an equivalent effective tax rate on capital income can 
also include computations for estate taxes (Poterba 1997). Second, income 
from safe assets (bonds) is taxable at the personal income tax rate.8 Third, 
any differential treatment of income received from private and public com- 
panies can be reflected in the individual tax rates. Fourth, estate and other 
taxes on accumulated wealth can reduce the amount of resources available 
to entrepreneurs for investment. 
Each entrepreneur has an initial level of pretax wealth,  W,  distributed 
uniformly over the index [0, W*].  Accumulations of wealth prior to the 
initial period are subject to estate, income, and capital gains taxes at the 
5. The 1998 Ontario budget would reduce the provincial corporate tax rate for CCPCs in 
eight steps from 9 to 4'/2  percent in 2005. 
6.  The two-period model is meant to capture a lengthy time period since creating a public 
firm can result in significant sunk transaction costs. 
7. The agent has private information about internal resources that is unavailable to the 
market. Those agents that go public would  convey  information  about their wealth. The 
model could enable one to derive a signaling equilibrium that would result in a cost imposed 
on the high-quality firms that would give up profitable investments. We use a simpler model 
for understanding the role played by taxes. 
8. Estate taxes can also fall on safe assets that are transferred to heirs. The tax rate on the 
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total effective rate 7.  Wealth can be invested in safe assets, b 2  0,9 earning 
the return r(1 -  t),  t being the effective tax rate on interest income. Alter- 
natively, wealth can be invested in the corporation, y ? 0. If the corpora- 
tion is a private one, the entrepreneur will receive all the income from the 
firm plus the value of the original capital, y, received as a tax-free return 
of capital. Let g(y,  e)  =f(y)cp(e)  be the expected pretax income of the firm 
that is strictly concave in its arguments, capital, y, and effort, e, the latter 
supplied at the equivalent monetary constant cost of c per unit.I0 At the 
end of the second period, the owner receives back the capital, y, plus the 
pretax income of the firm. Taxes paid  on pretax income of the private 
corporation are levied at the rate u, which is  the effective total tax rate 
incorporating corporate and personal income taxes on returns and poten- 
tially other taxes, such as estate taxes (this will be discussed further below 
in deriving effective tax rates on income). 
If the firm is private, the entrepreneur's  problem is to maximize con- 
sumption (end-of-period wealth) by  choosing the level of investment, y, 
and effort, e: 
(la)  maxy =  {W(l - T) - y}[1 +  r(l - t)]  +  y 
+ (1 - u)f[yl4el - ce, 
subject to 
(lb)  W(1 - 7)  - y  z  0. 




aw,iay  = (1 - u)fy(p - r(i - t) 2  0, 
awpiae = (1 - u)f~,  - c =  0. 
for y* 5  m(1 -  T), and 
Equation (2a) states that the entrepreneur will invest in capital until the 
after-tax marginal product of capital is equal to the after-tax cost of capi- 
tal, assuming that there are sufficient internal resources to invest in the 
firm (otherwise, the after-tax marginal product of capital is greater than 
9. It is assumed that the entrepreneur is constrained from borrowing funds from outside 
investors either directly or indirectly through the business. Thus, there is no bankruptcy in 
the model since all returns are in the form of equity. Short-selling constraints are appropriate 
since agency costs could arise if entrepreneurs borrow funds that may not be repaid to out- 
side investors. For a recent model incorporating such agency costs associated with the repay- 
ment of debt, see Hart and Moore (1998). 
10. Income is uncertain, but, without limiting generality, we  treat the variables in gross 
income as the certainty-equivalent  value. Taxes treat gains and losses symmetrically, and 
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the cost of capital as the entrepreneur gives up good projects). Equation 
(2b) states that the after-tax marginal product of effort is equal to its cost. 
Note that there is a value of after-tax initial wealth,  @”(  1 -  T),  that is the 
point at which wealth is just sufficient to meet the demands for capital, y, 
and invest in no bonds. High-wealth entrepreneurs with  wealth  greater 
than @‘(I  -  T)  will invest in both the firm and bonds. Low-wealth entre- 
preneurs with wealth less than  @‘(I  -  T)  will choose to invest only in the 
firm, with their investment constrained below the most profitable level of 
capital investment. 
Should the firm become public, the entrepreneur  sells off  some of the 
wealth held in the firm, E, to outside investors, or “angels,” prior to the 
determination  of  investment  and effort  decisions  by  the  entrepreneur. 
Angels can observe investment  levels but cannot monitor the entrepre- 
neur’s effort level. As derived below, the entrepreneur will let the firm be- 
come public only if there are insufficient resources available to maximize 
end-of-period wealth if the firm were to remain private. Thus, the gain to 
becoming public is achieving an effective lower cost of funds. The cost of 
becoming public is that the firm operates with an agency cost that arises 
from angels having imperfect information about the entrepreneur’s will- 
ingness to supply effort that has an associated nonpecuniary cost that the 
entrepreneur would like to avoid.” 
The value of equity sold to the angels is equal to E and is composed of 
two components (E  = ciy + C). The first is a share of capital investment, 
ciy, where ci is a proportion of capital financed by the angels. The second 
is a goodwill payment, C, a lump-sum payment paid to the entrepreneur 
from the angels for a share of the economic rents earned by  the private 
firm.I2 If the firm is public, the angels choose the share of capital invest- 
ment they wish to hold, given the goodwill payment, G.  The entrepreneur 
chooses the level of investment, contingent on the choice of a  made by 
the angels. Therefore, if the firm goes public, the problem for the entrepre- 
neur is solved by using subgame perfection-the  entrepreneur’s choices of 
effort  and investment  are made in reaction  to the shareholders’ choice 
of contract. 
If the firm goes public, the taxes on income are the following. The entre- 
preneur’s wealth is taxed at the rate T, and the return on bonds is taxed at 
1 1. The model could be extended to include other economic reasons for going public, such 
as risk diversification or obtaining better management support than can be supplied by  the 
angels (see Amit, Brander, and Zott 1997). These other economic factors affecting the status 
of business would play a role a determining the economic benefits and costs of going public. 
12. We assume that the goodwill payment is predetermined as a Nash bargaining solution 
between the entrepreneurs and the angels regarding the distribution of  “pure profits” or 
rents earned by the firm. Note that, at the maximum, G cannot be set such that the present 
value of the firm’s investment is negative, as shown in eq. (5)  below. Otherwise, the choice of 
G will depend on a bargaining outcome. In principle, G could also be subject to a capital 
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the rate  t for both the entrepreneur and the shareh01ders.I~  The entrepre- 
neur and the angels pay tax on the firm’s income at the rate 8. Any special 
relief for capital gains taxes on shares held in the entrepreneur’s firm would 
be captured in a lower value of 8.  We  note that there may be important 
differences between the rate of taxes that the entrepreneur pays when the 
firm is held privately (u) and the rate paid when the firm is public. Gener- 
ally, given some of the provisions of the U.S. and Canadian tax systems, 
we  expect that private-company ownership has more preferential  treat- 
ment, so u < 8. 
The entrepreneur’s investment and effort decision is determined by max- 
imizing end-of-period wealth, which is denoted as follows: 
(3)  =  (W(1 - 7)  - y  +  E}[1 +  r(l - t)] +  E 
+ (1 - a)(l - 8>fbl(f4eI  - ce. 
The entrepreneurial choices of investment and effort are determined, re- 
spectively, as follows: 
(44 
(4b) 
awsiay  = (1 - e)hcp  - r(i - t) =  0, 
awsiae  = (I - e)fqr - ~/(i  - a) =  0. 
The important distinction  between equations in (2) and (4)  is  that  the 
share of profits earned by the entrepreneur, (1 -  a),  affects the entrepre- 
neur’s effort decision,  reducing  the desire to  work.  In  this model,  the 
agency cost of going public is related to the entrepreneur’s effort decision, 
which affects the value of the firm-entrepreneurial  effort cannot be di- 
rectly compensated by the angels, who cannot monitor amounts provided. 
However, the higher the share of income (a)  paid to the angels, the lower 
is the incentive for work effort by the entrepreneur.14 
When  the  firm  is  public,  the  angels  maximize  their  end-of-period 
wealth, choosing a,  given that the entrepreneur chooses the optimal level 
of effort, e*, and capital, y*, to maximize the entrepreneur’s end-of-period 
wealth from equation (3): 
(5) maxV= a{y*[a]  + (1 - 8)(f[y*[a]]cple*[a]])>  -  (1 + r(l -  t))E,  2  0, 
with  e*  and y*  denoting  the  values that  maximize the  entrepreneur’s 
wealth for given levels of a.I5  The choice of a  by the angels that solves the 
equations in (5) is the following (applying the envelope theorem): 
13. Shareholders could have a different tax rate on bond income, but, to avoid unnecessary 
complexity, we ignore this difference for modeling purposes. 
14. The comparative static effects, &/dot,  can be  shown to be negative-an  additional 
share of income to the angels reduces effort by  the entrepreneur. 
15. Note that, in this problem, we do not incorporate a minimum participation constraint 
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(6)  W/&  =  ((1 - 8)fq - r(l - t)y}  + (1 - 8)olfqeae/aa =  0. 
For a maximum choice of CK  in (6), the after-tax income, net of the oppor- 
tunity cost of investing capital in bonds in the first term, is balanced with 
the loss in the entrepreneur’s effort in the second term. 
From the above, we  compare two outcomes for privately and publicly 
held firms in terms of the investment and effort decisions. For the public 
firm, the investment decision is determined  at the point where the after- 
tax marginal product of capital is equal to its cost of capital ([l -  Olfyq = 
r[l -  t]),  but the effort decision is provided at an additional cost beyond 
the entrepreneur’s marginal cost of supplying effort ([l -  elf., > c). For 
the private firm, investment may not be determined  at the cost of funds 
since the lack of internal resources may constrain the firm from achieving 
its full capacity, but the effort level is chosen at a lower cost on the basis 
of the entrepreneur’s cost of providing effort. 
Leaving  aside taxes,  the entrepreneur would  not consider  taking the 
firm public if there were sufficient internal resources to invest in capital- 
the agency cost associated with the entrepreneur’s effort decision reduces 
potential income should the firm become public. Thus, the choice of going 
public critically depends on the internal resources of the entrepreneurs (as 
well  as tax variables). High-wealth entrepreneurs, with  fi(1 -  7) > y*, 
would not go public, while low-wealth entrepreneurs would go public if 
the agency cost from a public offering is less than the gain from relaxing 
the entrepreneur’s capital constraint. 
With taxes, the decision whether to go public will be determined by the 
comparative statics of  the model: (a)  If income, capital gains, and estate 
taxes on the entrepreneur’s  return from investments in private firms are 
levied at a rate, u, that is less than the rate, 8, for public firms, then there 
will be greater incentive for the firm to be privately held, as reviewed in 
section 4.1 above. This seems to be the representative case for Canada. 
(b)  Estate, income, and capital gains taxes that reduce the initial accumu- 
lated  wealth  of entrepreneurs will  encourage more firms to be  publicly 
held. Since 7 reduces  the initial amount of wealth for investment, low- 
wealth entrepreneurs take on less investment and may be more willing to 
let the firm become public. (c) Any exemption for capital gains taxes or in- 
come earned on the basis of the status of the company (e.g., special incen- 
tives to sell shares for a public offering) reduces taxes on income held, 
creating an incentive for the firm to go public. As discussed in section 4.1, 
the United States does provide such an incentive for going public, while 
Canada provides capital gains incentives for private shares only. 
(investment in bonds). Here, we assume that the angels do  not have sufficient power to force 
the entrepreneur to give up all the excess returns associated with original ownership of the 
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The model presented above provides a basis for evaluating how the tax 
system affects the choice of firms to be public or private. 
4.3  Private and Public Companies: A Quantitative Review 
This section assesses the relative importance of private and public cor- 
porations in Canada, with some comparative data for the United States. 
Data sources for Canada include the LEAP (Longitudinal Employment 
Analysis Program) database, developed by  the University of British Co- 
lumbia and Statistics Canada, and data derived from corporate taxation 
statistics from Revenue Canada and Statistics Canada. The data for the 
United States include balance-sheet data from the Federal Reserve Board 
and data from  Statistics  of  Income, published by  the  Internal Revenue 
Service. 
As noted in section 4.1 above, both Canada and the United States have 
special tax provisions that favor private companies. For Canada, CCPCs 
have a low rate of corporate tax on the first $200,000 of net income. This 
effectively creates full integration for distributed earnings and a significant 
deferral for reinvested earnings. In addition, each of a CCPC’s sharehold- 
ers can realize up to $500,000 of  tax-free capital gains on the sale (or 
deemed sale) of his or her shares in the company. 
In the United States, certain private companies may qualify for S status. 
If S status is elected, all shareholders of the private corporation are taxed 
on a partnership basis-thereby  eliminating the double taxation of corpo- 
rate source income that would otherwise occur. 
Both systems have changed significantly over the postwar period. The 
special treatment of CCPCs in Canada dates from the 1971 income tax 
reforms. The lifetime capital gains exemption was introduced in 1985. 
In the United States, prior to the major income tax reform of 1986, the 
advantages of S status were attenuated by  personal marginal income tax 
rates well  above corporate  rates. This meant that corporations that re- 
invested a high share of earnings would not elect S status. The 1986 tax 
reform moved marginal personal rates below the corporate rate, effectively 
removing this disincentive for S status.I6 
As a result of these changes, the attractiveness of CCPC status in Can- 
ada and S status in the United States increased significantly after 1986.’’ 
Table 4.1 presents current (1998) effective  tax rates on private and public 
corporations in Canada and the United States on the basis of the features 
16. Some small corporations may still find S status unattractive because of the low rates 
of corporate tax on the first $75,000 of income. 
17. Subsequent changes in Canada-the  limitation of the general capital gains exemption 
and its elimination in  1994-enhanced  the attractiveness of the $500,000 exemption for 
CCPCs and farm property. In recent years, LLC status has become an alternative to S status 
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Table 4.1  Effective Tax Rates by Type of Corporation and Dividend-Payout Rates 
and the Decision to Go Public 
Effective Tax Rates 
Private  Public  Decision 
Cunadu (  CCPCs) 
100 percent payout: 
Small CCPC 
Large CCPC 
50 percent payout: 
Small CCPC under CGE 
Small CCPC above CGE 
Large CCPC under CGE 
Large CCPC above CGE 
Small CCPC under CGE 
Small CCPC above CGE 
Large CCPC under CGE 
Large CCPC above CGE 
Zero payout: 
United States (firms eligible for S stutus) 
100 percent payout 









































Note; CGE = capital gains exemption 
of the two tax structures described in section 4.1 above. These rates repre- 
sent the combined effect of corporate and personal income taxes and capi- 
tal gains taxes at the personal level. Details regarding these calculations 
are presented in the appendix. 
As is clear, the differences between the effective tax rate on a private 
corporation and the rate it would face if it were to go public vary with the 
dividend-payout ratio in both countries. In Canada, the effective rate also 
depends on whether the firm’s income is under the small business deduc- 
tion and on whether accrued capital gains would be covered by the lifetime 
capital gains exemption. 
We have simulated the decision of a cash-constrained firm whether to 
go public under alternative dividend-payout ratios using an arbitrary qua- 
dratic function for the underlying revenue function described in section 
4.2 above. The results are shown in the final column of table 4.1. Details 
are provided in the appendix. 
Taxes can play a major role affecting the decision whether to go public. 
In Canada, a CCPC would not typically go public until two conditions 
are met: (a) the firm must have exhausted its small business deduction, and 
(b)  the shareholders must have reached  the point at which incremental 
capital gains are not sheltered under the lifetime capital gains exemption. 
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less important for higher-payout firms, a CCPC would go public when it 
fully exhausts the small business deduction.I8 
In the United States, for firms that could qualify for S treatment, the 
decision also depends on the payout ratio. The lower the payout ratio, the 
less important is the double taxation of dividend income. At a sufficiently 
low payout ratio, the tax advantages of S status are insufficient to offset 
the advantages to a cash-constrained firm of going public. 
4.3.1 
Because of  the changed  tax incentives for the formation/election  of 
CCPCs and S corporations, we  decided to compare the situations of the 
two countries in  1994. This is  the latest year for which certain data are 
available and is several years after the major tax changes that fundamen- 
tally altered incentives. 
Figure 4.1 and table 4.2 provide a summary picture of the relative im- 
portance of private and public nonfinancial corporations in the two coun- 
tries. Note that private here refers to all closely held nonpublic companies, 
not just CCPCs and S status companies. 
Although the data are not strictly comparable, the difference in the rela- 
tive importance of private companies between the two countries is strik- 
ing. In Canada, private companies’ share of total assets is higher than the 
public companies’ share. In the United States, on the other hand, the mar- 
ket value of public companies’ equity is two and a half times the market 
value of closely held companies. 
One explanation of the difference is the much greater role of subsidiaries 
of foreign companies in Canada. Wholly owned subsidiaries of foreign com- 
panies (whether public or private) are classified as other private companies 
in Canada (i.e., private but not CCPCs). 
Figure 4.2 and table 4.3 provide some insight on this issue. If we  treat 
all corporations classified as other private as foreign subsidiaries and ex- 
clude their assets (and the assets in the other category) from the data, the 
relative share of private companies declines to 43 percent, and the share 
of public companies increases to 57 percent. The relative share of CCPCs 
is nevertheless substantially higher and the relative share of public compa- 
nies lower than the relative shares of  private and public corporations in 
the United States. Foreign subsidiaries explain part, but by no means all, 
of the difference between the two countries.19 
Another way  of examining the role of private corporations in Canada 
1994 Benchmark Comparison of Canada and the United States 
18. Note that, in the table, the tax rate for a large CCPC refers to a firm whose small 
business deduction has been fully clawed back. This would  occur at an asset level of $lS 
million. 
19. Note that the comparison presented above no doubt understates the relative impor- 
tance of closely held Canadian-controlled companies since some public companies are con- 
trolled by  foreign companies and some of the other private companies are not subsidiaries 
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Fig. 4.1  Share of nonfinancial corporations, Canada and the United States, 1994 
(Canada, assets) 
Table 4.2  Shares of Nonfinancial Corporations, Public versus Private, Canada and 
United States, 1994 
Private  Public 
Canada (assets)  .541  ,459 
United States (equity)  ,285  ,715 
Sources: Canada: Statistics Canada, special tabulations of Canadian corporations by  type, 
1992-96.  United States: Federal Reserve Board, unpublished balance-sheet data on market 
values of equities of closely held and public nonfinancial corporations, 1994. 
and the United States is to compare the relative importance of CCPCs in 
Canada with that of S corporations in the United States. As noted above, 
changes in  tax incentives in  the mid-1980s should have stimulated  the 
growth of both types of firms. This is confirmed in figures 4.3 and 4.4. In 
Canada, CCPCs increased in importance over the period 1984-93 (see fig. 
4.3). The expansion of CCPCs was accompanied by a decline in the rela- 
tive importance of unincorporated employers. Since proprietors and part- 
nerships were not eligible for the $500,000 capital gains exemption, the 
most likely explanation of this trend is that many of these types of enter- 
prises became incorporated. 
In the United States, the growth of S corporations after 1985 was much 
more dramatic, as illustrated in figure 4.4. S corporations’ share of total 
receipts increased from 5.1 percent in 1985 to 16.5 percent in 1994. Over 
the same period, the percentage of corporations that were S corporations 
more than doubled, from 22.1 percent in 1985  to 46.6 percent in 1994.  The 
dramatic increase in S corporations appears to have leveled off after 1992. 
The number and relative importance of S corporations in the United 
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Fig. 4.2  Share of nonfinancial corporations, Canada and the United States, 1994 
(Canada, excluding foreign assets) 
Table 4.3  Shares of Nonfinancial Corporations, Public versus Private, Canada and 
United States, 1994 
Private  Public 
Canada (assets)  ,438  ,572 
United States (equity)  ,285  .715 
Sources: See table 4.1 above. 
Note: Figures for Canada exclude foreign subsidiaries. 
Canada over the period 1985-94. However, in 1994, CCPCs were a much 
more important category within Canada than S corporations were within 
the United  States. CCPCs constituted 95 percent of  Canadian corpora- 
tions (vs. 47 percent for S corporations in the United States). Almost two- 
thirds of corporate employment in Canada was in  CCPCs. These firms 
accounted for 32 percent of the assets of nonfinancial corporations and 
47 percent of the income. In the United States, by contrast, S corporations 
accounted for 16.5 percent of receipts of all Corporations and 8.1 percent 
of the assets of nonfinancial corporations. 
Taken in conjunction with the aggregate data discussed above, these 
data indicate that S corporations represent a smaller share of the assets of 
privately held corporations  in  the United  States than CCPCs’ share of 
such assets does in Canada. 
The relative importance of S corporations and CCPCs varies with firm 
size. Figure 4.5 and table 4.4  present data for CCPCs classified by employ- 
ment size. Figure 4.6 and table 4.5 present data for S corporations classi- 
fied by  asset size. In Canada, CCPCs dominate the first four size classes, 
but their share of employment drops to 43 percent for the largest size class A  0.6  -  - 
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Fig. 4.3  CCPCs, other corporations, and unincorporated firms, Canada, 1984-93 
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Fig. 4.5  CCPCs’ share of all incorporated firms by number of ALUs, 
Canada, 1992 
Note: An ALU is a standardized unit of labor input, measured by  payroll divided by  the 
average wage for each industrylprovincelsize category. 
Table 4.4  CCPCs’ Shares of All Incorporated Firms by Firm Size (level of 
employment), Canada, 1992 
Number of  Number  Employment 







.97  .97 
.96  .96 
.92  .92 
.85  .84 
,155  .43 
.96  .65 
Source: Hendricks, Arnot, and Whistler (1997). 
Note: An ALU is a standardized unit of labor input, measured by  payroll divided by  the 
average wage for each industrylprovincelsize  class category. 
(one hundred or more employees). In the United States, S corporations 
account for about 40 percent of total receipts for asset size classes up to 
$25 million; their share then declines sharply with increasing size. 
More detailed data are available for CCPCs and other Canadian com- 
panies for two broad asset size classes-under  $15 million and $15 million 
and over. Data for nonfinancial corporations are presented  in figure 4.7 
and table 4.6. The results show that CCPCs dominate the smaller asset 
size group: CCPCs hold 86 percent of assets, earn 89 percent of revenue, 
and constitute 95 percent of these corporations. For the larger asset size 
class, CCPCs are much less important, holding  10 percent of assets and 
earning 14 percent of revenue. In terms of numbers of firms, CCPCs are 
more significant-38  percent of the larger firms were CCPCs. 
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Fig. 4.6  US. S corporations as a share of all corporations, 1994, by asset 
size ($million) 
Table 4.5  S Corporations’ Shares of All Incorporated Firms by Firm Size (assets), 
United States, 1994 
Assets  Number of  Total  Total 
($million)  Corporations  Assets  Receipts 
Under 0.1 
0.1  <0.25 
0.25<0.5 
0.511 
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Source: IRS (1994). 
size classes for all corporations in the United States divided between those 
with assets under $10 million and those with assets of $10 million and 
over (see fig. 4.8 and table 4.7). These may be compared with data for all 
Canadian corporations presented in figure 4.9 and table 4.8. S corpora- 
tions accounted for 41 percent of receipts for the smaller size group but 
only 7 percent for the larger size group. In contrast, CCPCs accounted for 
88 percent of revenue for smaller and 12 percent for larger firms (see fig. 
4.9 and table 4.8). 
4.3.2  Summary 
It is clear from the data we have reviewed that private companies play 
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Fig. 4.7  CCPCs’ share of nonfinancial corporations by asset size, Canada, 1994 
Table 4.6  CCPCs’ Shares of Nonfinancial Corporations by Firm Size (assets), 
Canada, 1994 
Assets  Number of  Total  Total 
($million)  Corporations  Assets  Revenues 
Under 15  .951  .860  ,887 
15+  ,384  ,104  ,139 
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Fig. 4.8  S corporations’ share of all corporations by asset size, United 
States, 1994 
Table 4.7  S Corporations’ Shares of All Incorporated Firms by Firm Size (assets), 
United States, 1994 
Assets  Number of  Total  Total 
($million)  Corporations  Assets  Receipts 
Under 10  .470  .422  ,409 
10+  ,200  ,015  ,067 
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Fig. 4.9  CCPCs’ share of all incorporated firms by asset size, Canada, 1994 
Table 4.8  CCPCs’ Shares of All Corporations by Firm Size (assets), Canada, 
1994 
Assets  Number of  Total  Total 
($million)  Corporations  Assets  Revenues 
Under 15  ,946  ,859  ,878 
15+  ,367  ,072  ,122 
Source: Statistics Canada, special tabulation of  Canadian corporations by type, 1992-96 
importance  of  subsidiaries  of  foreign  corporations  in  Canada explains 
only part of the difference. Domestic private companies are more impor- 
tant in Canada than are their counterparts in the United States. 
Whether tax rather than nontax factors provided the greater encourage- 
ment for private firms in Canada cannot be resolved here. But it is clear 
that the combination of full integration for dividend income, substantial 
deferrals for retained earnings, and a special capital gains tax exemption 
provide a powerful incentive for attaining and retaining CCPC status. The 
data provide some confirmation of these results. 
Appendix 
Simulations of Decisions to Go Public 
under Representative Tax Regimes 
The purpose of this appendix is to explore how the Canadian and U.S. 
tax structures may  affect the decision to go public. We  first determine Corporations and Taxation: A Largely Private Matter?  131 
representative tax systems for the two countries. The basic rates used to 
construct the effective tax rates shown in table 4.1 above are presented in 
table 4A.  1. The rates shown in table 4A.  1 capture the essential features of 
the two systems of taxation. 
The U.S. system consists of a “classic” corporate tax unintegrated with 
the personal tax, except for S status corporations, which are treated as 
equivalent to partnerships. The Canadian system has full integration for 
dividend income from small CCPCs and partial integration, through divi- 
dend credits, for other corporations. Canada also has a $500,000 lifetime 
capital gains exemption for shareholders of large or small CCPCs. Both 
countries provide favorable tax treatment for capital gains. U.S. tax rates 
are generally lower than Canadian rates, with the exception of dividend in- 
come and corporate income of small corporations, where Canadian rates 
are lower. 
Effective combined tax rates on shareholders of corporations are de- 
rived by applying the applicable personal tax rates on dividends and capi- 
tal gains to corporate distributions and retentions, as follows: 
T  =  tc + (1 - tc)P.  td  + (1 - tc)(l - P)tg, 
where tc is the corporate tax rate, td is the tax rate on dividends, tg is the 
effective accrual tax rate on capital gains, P  is the dividend-payout ratio, 
and T is the total effective tax rate. 
The results are presented in table 4A.2. Of course, what matters for the 
Table 4A.l  Representative Effective Marginal Tax Rates 
~~ 
Income Type  Canada  United States 
Corporate income:’ 
Public corporations  .43  .39 
Private corporations  .21  Partnership treatment 
Dividends  .34  .44 
Interest income  .51  .44 
Capital gains: 
Nominal rate  .38  .20 
Effective accrued rate  ’  .22  .I0 
Under lifetime capital 
Personal income: 
gains exemption  0  N.A. 
Note; N.A. = not applicable. 
“For Canada and the United States, the corporate tax rates are from Technical Committee 
on Business Taxation (1998, p. 3.26). 
bFor Canada, these rates are the combined federal and provincial rates for a top-bracket 
taxpayer in Ontario in 1998. For the United States, these rates are based on federal rates for 
1998, with an assumed effective net state personal income tax rate of 4 percent. Relevant 
personal tax rates are for top bracket taxpayers. (Source: Tux Facts, 1997-98  1997.) 132  Robert D. Brown, Jack M. Mintz, and Thomas A. Wilson 
Table 4A.2  Effective Total Tax Rates by  Type of Corporation and Payout Ratio, 
1998 
Payout Ratio 
and Corporate Type  Private  Publica 
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When a CCPC or an S corporation goes public, it loses CCPC or S status. 
decision to go public is not so much the average levels of taxation but the 
differences in tax burdens between public and private corporations. These 
are presented in table 4A.3. 
The tax incentive for private status is actually stronger in the United 
States for firms with high  payout  ratios. As partnership  status and full 
integration are equivalent when the payout ratio is 100 percent, the advan- 
tages of  S status in  the United  States are greater than those of CCPC 
status in Canada because there is no dividend credit for public companies 
in the United States. At medium payout ratios, the situation is reversed, 
with small CCPCs having a greater tax incentive to remain private than S 
corporations. Finally, at low payout ratios, both small CCPCs and large 
CCPCs where shareholders have not exhausted their lifetime capital gains 
exemption have a greater tax incentive to remain private than do S corpo- 
rations in the United States. US. corporations ineligible for S status and 
Canadian CCPCs that have exhausted their small business deductions and Corporations and Taxation: A Largely Private Matter?  133 
~~ 
Table 4A.3  Tax Incentives for Private Status, Canada versus United States, by  Payout Ratio 
Tax Advantage of Staying Private 
Canada 
Payout 
Small CCPC  Large CCPC  United States 
Under  Above  Under  Above  Eligible for  Ineligible for 
CGE  CGE  CGE  CGE  S Status  S Status 
~  ~ 
100 percent  .15  .15  Nil  Nil  .22  Nil 
50 percent  .24  .I6  .06  Nil  .I1  Nil 
0 percent  .35  .17  .13  Nil  .01  Nil 
lifetime capital gains exemptions are essentially treated the same as public 
corporations.20 
In order to explore the effect of these tax rates on the decision to go 
public, we  have constructed a simulation model with the underlying rev- 
enue function represented by  a quadratic function. The parameters are 
selected so that a cash-constrained firm would choose to go public in the 
absence of taxes. Effective tax rates are then introduced into the model, 
and the model is solved to determine whether the firm will go public or 
remain private. 
The revenue function f(  y)cp(e) is represented by the quadratic function 
ay - -by2  +  me - -ge2  +  dey. 
Parameters specified are a = 3, b = 0.5, d = 0.25, g = 0.5, and m = 3. 
This function is then used in equation (6).  We also set the real return (r) 
at 0.04, and the marginal cost of effort (c) is normalized at 1. Tax parame- 
ters are from table 4.1 above. For each case shown in table 4.1, we  deter- 
mine the level of initial wealth  Wl(1 -  T) where going public would in- 
crease total wealth. If  no positive level is found, we  determine that the 
firm will stay private. If there is any range of values for  W1(l -  T)  where 
going public would increase total wealth, we determine that the firm will 
go public.*’ 
1  1 
2  2 
20. This refers to basic rates of tax. However, there are other features of the tax laws that 
may favor private status. 
21. Total wealth includes the wealth of outside investors as well as the wealth of the entre- 
preneur. In all cases, a side payment to the entrepreneur is required for the firm to go public. 
In three of the Canadian cases shown in table 4.1, the firm would go public for any value 
of initial wealth below  W1.  In one of the U.S.  cases, the firm would go public if initial wealth 
is below 78 percent of  W(l -  T). 134  Robert D.  Brown, Jack M. Mintz, and Thomas A. Wilson 
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Comment  Daniel Feenberg 
The days when Arnold Harberger could model the corporate tax system 
with a single parameter are but a nostalgic memory for older public fi- 
nance economists. The change is partly progress made by  economists in 
understanding the nature of corporate taxation and partly backsliding by 
legislatures with little regard for efficiency or horizontal equity. The results 
are that tax-induced effects on the cost of capital depend not only on the 
income of shareholders, the financing method, and the holding period but 
also the age, number, and nationality of controlling shareholders. 
Brown, Mintz, and Wilson build a combined model of all these tax pa- 
rameters to find the differential between the total tax rate on privately and 
publicly held corporations in Canada and the United States. In Canada, 
the tax rates are calculated for Canadian-controlled private corporations, 
while, in the United States, the somewhat similar S corporations are mod- 
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eled. The perspective is one of a newly formed corporation rather than a 
preexisting one. 
Except for firms expecting very high payout rates, the authors find a 
noticeably stronger tax incentive to remain private in Canada than exists 
in the United States. This could well be the reason for the observation doc- 
umented in this paper that a greater share of business equity is private in 
Canada than in the United States. 
While nearly comprehensive in its treatment of taxes, the paper does 
not quantify some related tax issues that might affect the decision to re- 
main private. In the United States, the estate tax is a significant levy, typi- 
cally over 50 percent at moderate levels of wealth. Although the estate tax 
is often offered in the popular press as a reason for companies to go public 
(to raise liquidity to pay the tax), it is more likely that the effect goes the 
other way. Private firms are treated to a valuation discount of 35 percent, 
the tax on a closely held family firm can be paid in installments over ten 
years, and the appraised valuation of a private firm is likely to be far lower 
than stock market valuations of the similar firms in public hands. Gifts of 
partial interests can often be structured to have little taxable value. While 
it would be difficult to judge the quantitative significance of these consid- 
erations, they all point to the desirability of maintaining private control. 
The Canadian system of taxing capital gains at death appears to create a 
smaller incentive (in the same direction). 
Another consideration is the far greater latitude that private companies 
have to press the edges of tax avoidance. The public company is restricted 
by the desirability of obtaining an audited financial statement from a na- 
tionally respected auditor with few reservations. The private company can 
stand a few reservations about the need for a reserve against future tax as- 
sessments. 
Other explanations for the prevalence of private companies in Canada 
are not excluded by the evidence presented. The industrial mix is differ- 
ent in Canada. Mining is a larger share of the economy, and information 
asymmetries provide an obvious possible explanation for the unsuitability 
of such firms for public ownership. Some Canadian firms have grown large 
in a protected home market that is much smaller than the corresponding 
U.S. market. Smaller firms are better suited for private ownership. Bank- 
ruptcy laws differ between the two countries, as do many other institutions 
and customs. Restrictions on branch banking may have encouraged U.S. 
firms to be publicly held. This list is hardly exhaustive. Any of these cross- 
country differences could be the true explanation for the difference. So 
this paper is not necessarily the last word on the subject, even if it seems 
convincing to a discussant now. I will not comment on the possibility that 
training in public finance made me more sympathetic to this view  than 
others might be. 
One particularly disquieting note is the observation that private firms 136  Robert D. Brown, Jack M. Mintz, and Thomas A. Wilson 
are always preferentially taxed  relative to publicly held  firms. The tax- 
minimizing strategy is always private in both countries. In reality, as in the 
authors’ model, the desire to deploy more capital without assuming more 
risk  drives the firm to public markets.  But, while most capital in  both 
countries is in publicly traded firms, the structure of firms is very different. 
Canadian firms are often arranged in vertical pyramids with substantial 
minority equity at lower levels. U.S. firms are either subsidiaries or inde- 
pendent, (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer 1998). In the United 
States, the limitations on the intercorporate dividend deduction make it 
expensive for controlled subsidiaries to raise equity of their own. This ex- 
plains the absence of pyramids in the United States. But what explains 
their presence elsewhere? 
The controlling shareholders in a pyramid may control an empire while 
supplying only a small fraction of the capital and absorb only a small 
portion of the risk. That is a benefit for them, but only if they can attract 
and exploit outside finance. What is the advantage to the minority share- 
holders providing that capital? Are minority shareholders even a signifi- 
cant source of  capital? Do they share fully in company profits? Are they 
protected through the legal system, through relationships of blood, mar- 
riage, or business? If not, are their alternative investments restricted by 
capital controls or weak property rights? 
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have argued that outsider finance is a feature 
of common law countries with strong protection for investors. Canada is 
one of those countries with a strong common law heritage, yet many Cana- 
dian corporations  are organized  in pyramids  typical  of  countries with 
weak protection for shareholders. What is the motivation for that organi- 
zation? 
A full deduction for intercorporate dividends would appear to be a logi- 
cal part of correctly valuing corporate income. If the United States joined 
the rest of the world in providing such a deduction, would the US. cor- 
porate structure drift toward the Canadian form? Would that be a good 
thing? There are lots of good questions left. 
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